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Abstract. Companies are under pressure to be in control of their assets but at 
the same time they must operate as efficiently as possible. This means that they 
aim to implement ―good-enough security‖ but need to be able to justify their 
security investment plans. Currently companies achieve this by means of 
checklist-based security assessments, but these methods are a way to achieve 
consensus without being able to provide justifications of countermeasures in 
terms of business goals. But such justifications are needed to operate securely 
and effectively in networked businesses. In this paper, we first compare a Risk-
Based Requirements Prioritization method (RiskREP) with some requirements 
engineering and risk assessment methods based on their requirements elicitation 
and prioritization properties. RiskREP extends misuse case-based requirements 
engineering methods with IT architecture-based risk assessment and 
countermeasure definition and prioritization. Then, we present how RiskREP 
prioritizes countermeasures by linking business goals to countermeasure 
specification. Prioritizing countermeasures based on business goals is especially 
important to provide the stakeholders with structured arguments for choosing a 
set of countermeasures to implement. We illustrate RiskREP and how it 
prioritizes the countermeasures it elicits by an application to an action case. 
Keywords: Non-functional requirements; Risk assessment; Misuse Cases; IT 
architecture; Security; Prioritization. 
1 Introduction 
Today, organizations are under high pressure to prove that they are in control of their 
assets, which means among other things that they must prove that they sufficiently 
secured their IT assets. At the same time, they are increasingly cost-sensitive and 
hence they aim at reducing security risks in a cost-effective way. The common 
solution is to use checklists to identify the largest risks and mitigate them. However, 
checklists are based on past experience and are useful for achieving consensus among 
experts, but do not necessarily provide justifications that are based on business goals 
or technical characteristics of the system. Such ad hoc analyses are risky in the face of 
current fast-changing information technology (IT) [14, 20]. Furthermore, such 
justifications provide a proof of common maturity level which is necessary for 
networks of businesses to operate securely and effectively. In a previous work we 
presented RiskREP [8]. RiskREP allows the justification of security investments in 
terms of the vulnerabilities of the business processes and the IT architecture in 
relation to the business goals to be achieved.  
We build on current proposals for extending requirements engineering (RE) 
methods with security risk assessment (RA) [4, 6, 7, 13, 15, 18, 19]. In Section 2, we 
compare some RE methods and RA methods to necessary requirements elicitation and 
prioritization features. We present the meta model of RiskREP in Section 3, present 
how RiskREP elicits and prioritizes countermeasures by linking business goals to 
countermeasure specifications in Section 4, and discuss lessons learned from an 
action case study in Section 5.  
2   Related Work 
In this section, we compare some well-known RE and RA methods based on their 
requirements elicitation and prioritization properties. Tables 1 and 2 present an 
overview of this comparison. Please note that this list cannot be complete, considering 
the vast amount of existing methods. Here, we present only those methods that satisfy 
most of the properties which we considered as success criteria when developing 
RiskREP. Tables 1 and 2 use these properties as criteria for comparing the methods.  
We advocate that the elicitation of security requirements must follow a systematic 
process, because this supports the traceable justification each requirement. In order to 
be complete, we want to differentiate between business and quality goals, to consider 
both permissible use and misuse, and to explicitly include different stakeholder views 
in order to arrive at security requirements which reflect the multi-perspective nature 
of security.  
When prioritizing requirements and identifying the optimal set of security 
requirements to implement, one needs to know the risks against which the 
requirement will counteract. Risk is described by impact and incident likelihood. 
Security requirements are compared to each other both based on their monetary costs 
and effectiveness against the risk, i.e. risk reduction achieved. Additionally, combined 
effects of requirements play a role, like the potential of security measures to replace 
each other or to complement each other. 
To systematically elicit security requirements, Elahi and Yu [5], Stamatis [18] and 
Mayer et al. [12] propose to derive requirements from high level goals. . We believe 
that a security requirements elicitation method should also differentiate between 
business goals (i.e. desired properties of the business) and quality goals (i.e. desired 
properties of the software) – where quality goals include security goals). Despite the 
fact that most of the approaches that we compare, e.g. [6, 11, 15, 19] differentiate 
between functional and non-functional goals of software systems, none of them 
differentiate between business and quality goals. 
To address the security concerns of system owners, recently developed RE 
methods, e.g. [5, 9, 17, 19], model not only permissible uses but also misuses of 
system components.  
Eliciting information on permissible uses and misuses, on business goals as well 
as quality goals, requires expertise of stakeholders with different backgrounds. Only a 
few of the approaches that we consider in this comparison ([2, 5, 9, 11, 17]) express 
how different stakeholder views can be considered when eliciting information. GSRM 
[9], for instance, differentiates the perspectives of user, business analyst, requirements 
engineer, and risk manager. 
Once the security requirements are identified, one has to check whether they are 
implementable within the available budget. Usually, this is not the case, and one has 
to decide which set of requirements should be implemented and which requirements 
can be disregarded. Making such a decision requires the estimation of the security 
risks the system is exposed to, considering the trade-off among the different 
requirements, as well as their costs and effectiveness. However, only some methods 
(such as FMEA [18], Tropos based approaches [1, 5], GSRM [9], Attack Graphs [16], 
extended KAOS [19], and the approach proposed by Mayer et al. [12]) take into 
consideration the risk the system is exposed to. 
 
Table 1: Comparison of some RE methods with respect to requirements 
elicitation and prioritization features. 
 Elahi and 
Yu [5]  
Misuse 
Cases [17] 
extended 
KAOS [19] 
ATAM 
[11] 
NFR frame-
work [15] 
Requirements elicitation 
Systematic 
process 
derives 
soft-goals 
from 
goals 
yes no no derives soft-
goals from 
goals 
Differentiation 
between 
business and 
quality goals 
goals and 
soft-goals  
 
no functional and 
non-functional 
goals 
yes  
 
technical and 
business 
objective 
Considering 
both permissible 
use and misuse 
use and 
misuse 
use cases & 
misuse 
cases 
goal and anti-
goal 
no no 
Considering 
different 
stakeholder 
views 
yes yes no yes no 
Requirements prioritization 
Estimation of 
impact 
no no no no no 
Estimation of 
incident 
likelihood 
level of 
evidence  
 
no for deter-
mining the 
granularity 
no no 
Prioritization yes real cost no volume of no 
based on 
monetary costs of 
requirements 
change 
Considering 
effectiveness of 
requirements 
3 levels  no no no no 
Considering 
combined effects 
of requirements 
between 
soft-
goals 
no no trade-off 
points 
between soft-
goals 
 Table 2: Comparison of widely known RA methods with respect to 
requirements elicitation and prioritization features.  
 FMEA [18]  Attack 
Graphs [16] 
CORAS 
[2] 
Secure 
Tropos [1] 
GSRM [9] 
Requirements elicitation 
Systematic 
process 
yes no no yes yes 
Differentiation 
between business 
and quality goals 
no no no 3 layers: 
asset, event, 
treatment  
project 
goals and 
sub goals 
Considering both 
permissible use 
and misuse 
no no no yes: tasks 
and risks 
risk events 
and tasks 
Considering 
different 
stakeholder views 
no no yes no yes  
Requirements prioritization 
Estimation of 
impact 
failure 
effect 
no depends 
on 
selected 
model 
 severity of 
impact 
risk impact 
Estimation of 
incident 
likelihood 
occurrence 
of failure 
probability, 
average time 
or cost/effort 
depends 
on the 
model 
 event 
likelihood 
risk likelihood 
Prioritization 
based on 
monetary costs of 
requirements 
no financial loss 
or loss of 
system 
no yes no 
Considering 
effectiveness of 
requirements 
detection 
rate 
no no  
qualitatively 
effectiveness 
Considering 
combined effects 
of requirements 
no no no qualitatively no 
The methods that take into consideration effectiveness levels of requirements refer 
to different attributes of the IT system that is analyzed. Elahi et al. [6] differentiate 
among three levels according to whether the countermeasure alleviates the effects of 
vulnerabilities, patches them or prevents malicious tasks. Secure Tropos [1] 
differentiates between four categories of countermeasures (removal/avoidance, 
prevention, attenuation, and retention) depending on how they mitigate the risk in the 
event layer. Finally, FMEA [18] differentiates according to incident detection rate. 
When taken together, requirements may contradict with each other or support each 
other. Elahi and Yu [5], NFR framework [15], Mayer et al. [12], and Secure Tropos 
[1] consider these combined effects and prioritize the requirements accordingly. 
ATAM [11] also considers how requirements affect each other ―trade-off points‖. 
Tables 1 and 2 show that the RE and RA methods we have compared do not have 
all the requirements elicitation and prioritization features that we think are important. 
Therefore, we developed RiskREP [8]. RiskREP is built on the CRAC++ [14] and 
MOQARE [7] methods. The following Section 3 presents RiskREP´s meta model 
which explicitly considers different perspectives on security, and Section 4 illustrates 
RiskREP´s systematic process with extracts from an action case.  
3 Meta model of RiskREP 
Fig. 1: Meta-model showing the concepts and their interrelations.  
The meta model (Figure 1) contains concepts from three perspectives, i.e. the business 
perspective, the user perspective and the technical perspective. Before RiskREP is 
applied, a model of the system´s architecture and specifications of the system´s 
functionality from user perspective (e.g. modeled as use cases) must exist. To these 
system models, RiskREP adds the security aspect. 
Business perspective: Business goals are desired properties of the business. 
Business goals justify system requirements. An example of business goal is ―efficient 
business processes‖. A business damage is a state or activity of the business that 
violates a business goal. The business damage completes the business view by asking 
what should not happen. An example of business damage is ―users don’t use the 
system to be‖. A quality goals are desired qualities of the IT system, i.e. a desired 
state of the system. These goals are expressed as high-level quality requirements that 
consist of a quality attribute and an asset, like ―confidentiality of password‖. A quality 
deficiency is a lack of quality attribute for an asset that violates quality goals and 
might causes business damage.  
User perspective: Quality attributes are attributes of the system to be protected. 
They describe aspects or characteristics of quality, e.g. confidentiality. We use the 
quality attributes of the ISO 9126 [3] and assume that these completely categorize all 
relevant aspects of an IT systems quality. Assets are parts of the system that are 
valuable for the organization, e.g. information, software, or hardware. They need to 
be protected from malicious activities in order to achieve business goals. Value 
quantifies the criticality of each quality goal with respect to the business. The value is 
used to prioritize the quality goals against each other. It is determined by the impact 
that the compromise of an asset would cause to the business. 
Misuse Cases [17] describe scenarios in which a threat agent can cause a quality 
deficiency. The misuse case takes the perspective of the user and describes what 
happens at the interface between user and system. They are identified by analyzing 
the business process and the Use Cases of the system. The misuse cases are prioritized 
based on their execution ease and the impact, which they cause to the asset(s). Threats 
are actions, which cause a quality deficiency that causes the violation of a quality 
goal, e.g. data theft violates the confidentiality of data. Vulnerabilities are a property 
of the assets or the IT system or its environment that can be exploited by threat 
agents. This exploitation could violate a quality goal. Vulnerabilities can be unwanted 
properties like ―lack of technical change management‖ or also wanted properties of 
the system such as ―Single-Sign On‖. A threat agent is a person, i.e. an insider or an 
outsourcer or an outsider that intentionally or unintentionally executes a threat. A 
threat agent can be characterized in terms of his motivation, goal and attributes, e.g. 
disgruntled employee.  
Countermeasures are mitigation, detection or prevention mechanisms. They partly 
or completely counteract a threat-vulnerability pair or the threat agent, and reduce the 
estimated impact at threat/vulnerability and/or the ease of threat execution. 
Countermeasures are expressed as (security) requirements on the IT system. Cost is 
an attribute of a countermeasure. It consists of implementation cost and the cost of 
ownership. Depending on the depth of the assessment we either use partially ordered 
scale or the real costs. In case the real costs are used then the risk expert may 
calculate the implementation cost based on required hours and salary per hour. The 
expected effectiveness of a countermeasure is given by the expected risk reduction it 
achieves. Most countermeasures either influence the impact or the execution ease of 
an Incident Propagation Path.  
Technical perspective: Incident Propagation Paths are descriptions of misuse 
case from the technical perspective. In some cases, an Incident Propagation Path 
consists of several interconnected steps. That is a threat agent causing a quality 
deficiency on an asset by executing one or more threats, which exploit vulnerabilities 
of several assets. Such Incident Propagation Path scenarios are important for humans 
to imagine the flow of events including the causes and consequences of incidents. 
Like the misuse cases, the Incident Propagation Paths are prioritized based on their 
execution ease and the impact they have. There may be several Incident Propagation 
Paths realizing the same misuse case. The execution ease of a misuse case is an 
estimation of the effort required to carry out a misuse case. This effort is determined 
by the most resistant vulnerability that needs to be exploited to carry out the misuse 
case. In our approach, the execution ease is considered to be in correlation with the 
likelihood that a threat is actually executed by the ―strongest‖ threat agent. Impact is 
the damage caused to the assets by the execution of a misuse case. 
4  Steps of the RiskREP method 
The four steps of the method are:  
1. Quality goal analysis: identify business goals, business damages, quality 
deficiencies and quality goals;  
2. Risk analysis: identify misuse case (threats, threat agents, vulnerabilities) and 
estimate their impact on assets, and their ease of execution by means of 
incident propagation paths;  
3. Countermeasure definition: specify countermeasures and estimate their cost; 
and  
4. Countermeasure prioritization: assess effectiveness of countermeasures in 
reducing misuse case risk, their cost and dependencies.  
At each of these steps, it is possible to either analyze the complete system, all 
business goals, and all misuse cases, respectively or to focus on the most important 
aspects. RiskREP is currently supported by spreadsheet tables.  
The information that the RiskREP method uses is elicited from three stakeholder 
categories: business owner, IT manager and security officer who represent the 
business, IT and user perspective, respectively. The method is executed by an RE 
expert and a risk expert, who elicit the necessary information by semi-structured 
interviews with the other stakeholders. We applied the method in the TUgether 
project of the University Braunschweig (TU), in which a portal is developed to 
provide all on-line services of the TU, such as email, library access, registration for 
exams etc. available to students and employees. The portal must allow students to 
sign-on via one individually configurable interface. One major objective is that all 
students should eventually use the portal.  
In the first phase of the project the portal framework product was selected which 
satisfied requirements best. Eighty functional and non-functional requirements were 
specified and about 70 products were considered. Our case study is restricted to the 
eleven security requirements of the 80 requirements.  
The TUgether project was at an early development stage at the time we started 
applying RiskREP to it. We received from the project team the complete requirements 
specification. After analyzing it, we had several meetings with the project team to 
elicit the information RiskREP uses, such as the IT architecture of the TUgether 
portal. We concluded the action case by presenting the output of the method to the 
business owner, IT manager and security officer in a meeting and asked their opinion 
about the information RiskREP delivered. We now run through the steps of the 
method. 
Step 1: Quality goal analysis  
We could infer the security-related business perspective concepts from a project 
report which had been written before the case study. Figure 2 shows an extract of this 
analysis. Business goal “gaining user acceptance” (BG5) is threatened by one 
business damage, “Portal will not be used” (BD6). Three quality deficiencies may 
cause this, viz. User unfriendliness (QD7), lack of trust (QD8), and lack of added 
value (QD9). Because of the scope of our case study, we analyzed only quality goal 
“lack of trust” (QD8) further. QD8 can be avoided by three high level quality goals, 
i.e. Confidentiality of assets (QG5), Integrity of assets (QG6), and Availability of 
assets (QG7). Step 1 ensures that all software quality goals are justified by to business 
goals – including security. 
 
 
Fig. 2: Business concepts elicited with RiskREP 
Step 2: Risk analysis 
The risk expert first identifies possible misuse cases that may threaten a quality 
goal and estimate their impact on assets and ease of execution. In addition, the 
security expert draws Incident Propagation Paths through the architecture that 
connects entry points of the system to the misuse case. This allows us the estimation 
of the ease of execution of the misuse case. Modeling the execution ease is also the 
main difference between Incident Propagation Paths and Misuse Case Maps [10].  
The risk expert also assesses the value of each quality goal, for example by using 
value models for availability [20] or confidentiality [14] and then estimates the impact 
or damage caused by the misuse case to these quality goals. This way we maintain the 
link between business goals and impact of a misuse case. 
For example, in the case study, misuse case ―Manipulation of account data‖ 
(MC5) threatens quality goal ―Integrity of assets‖ (QG6). There are five threat agents, 
viz. user, hacker, portal admin, portal developer and service developer. In the portal 
architecture (Figure 3), the critical IT assets related to misuse case ―Manipulation of 
data‖ (MC5) are: TUgether portal server, LDAP server and Development server. We 
used a scale from 1 (low) to 3 (high) to indicate execution ease and impact. The 
execution ease of misuse case ―Manipulation of data‖ (MC5) was estimated 1.5 and 
its impact was estimated 1. Incident Propagation Paths are described by the misuse 
case good enough here and therefore we did not draw them. In total, related to quality 
goal ―Integrity of assets‖ (QG6), we identified ten misuse cases, one of which we 
show in Table 3. As this table illustrates, the risk of a misuse case is represented by a 
pair (ease of execution, impact on assets) where each of the two components of risk 
has a totally ordered scale. This defines a partial ordering of misuse cases according 
to their risk. Unlike in other risk assessment methods, we do not multiply ease with 
impact, but instead form categories of misuse cases, based on the priorities of the 
stakeholders. For instance, an misuse case with ease and impact equal to 3 can be 
called a ―catastrophe‖, and the misuse case category ―frequent, but harmless‖ 
describes misuse case where ease is high, but impact is low. 
Fig. 3: TUgether portals IT architecture. (FW: Firewall, DC: Data Center, CAS: 
Central Authentication Service, SON: Personal Development Server.)  
Step 3: Countermeasure definition.  
The security officer and RE expert compose a set of countermeasures by taking them 
from existing checklists. These checklists are part of RiskREP and contain general 
countermeasures for 167 threat vulnerability pairs. In this step of RiskREP, one brings 
these general measures to a concrete, realizable level by specifying which component 
each of them applies to and how. Table 2 shows the results of this step on our case. 
Cost estimations are indicated by a 0 (no cost), 1 (changing the settings of 
applications), 2 (installing and maintaining freely available countermeasures) and 3 
(purchasing, installing and maintaining countermeasures).  
Table 3: Some misuse cases (MC) and their attributes. 
MC ID risk 
(ease, 
impact) 
Threat 
agent 
Threat Vulnerability 
MC5: 
manipulation 
of account 
data 
(1.5,1) Hacker data get lost or are 
manipulated during 
transfer 
Portal does not manage data 
and therefore data 
synchronization between 
portal and services is 
necessary 
MC9: no 
logout in 
computer pool 
(1,3) User does not log out after 
having used the portal 
on a computer in the 
public computer pool 
no access control to 
computer pools 
Step 4: Countermeasure prioritization 
By applying countermeasures to misuse cases, one reduces risk. However, 
applying countermeasures usually means increased spending. Therefore, RiskREP 
aims at finding the ideal set of countermeasures to be applied. The best set of 
countermeasures is that with minimum total cost and maximum risk reduction. To 
find an optimum set, we must compare several sets of countermeasures. In practice, 
the security budget of the system is often the main delimiter for the ideal set of 
countermeasures. To prioritize countermeasures, their effectiveness in reducing the 
risk of misuse case must be quantified. We measure the effectiveness of a 
countermeasure with respect to a risk by the effect on decreasing both the ease of an 
attacker executing an attack and the impact of that attack. Ease as well as impact can 
be increased (+1), decreased (-1) or unaffected (0 points) by the application of a 
countermeasure. In this way it is easy to estimate and is less prone to mistakes. If 
necessary, RiskREP allows using more sophisticated scales. 
Countermeasures interact with each other. For instance, some may be overlapping, 
or diminish each other’s effectiveness. We documented the combined effect of pairs 
of countermeasures for TUgether in a two dimensional matrix containing 10 
interactions, and discussed this with the security officer. The matrix is sparse and not 
symmetric; because it is possible that countermeasure c1 influences c2, but not vice 
versa. In the case study, it contains 10 interactions, whereas among the 10 
countermeasures 90 different interactions would be theoretically possible.  
We then prioritized countermeasures according to their cost and effectiveness. Just 
as for risk, no multiplications or additions can be done because the scales we use are 
ordinal. The security objectives of companies and their security strategies differ from 
each other. Therefore, RiskREP defines company-specific heuristic for the 
countermeasure prioritization. We classified countermeasures according to their cost 
and effectiveness in the following categories:  
 no effect: both execution ease and impact of a misuse case are not modified 
by the countermeasure 
 contra-effective: both execution ease and impact of a misuse case are 
increased, or one is increased and the other one is not modified, by the 
countermeasure; 
 counter-effective: The countermeasure increases execution ease and reduces 
impact of the misuse case, or vice versa; 
 low hanging fruit: cost is 0, either only execution ease or only impact of a 
misuse case is reduced by the countermeasure; or both execution ease and 
impact of a misuse case are reduced by the countermeasure; 
 cost-efficient: cost is 1 and either only execution ease or only impact of a 
misuse case is reduces by the countermeasure; or both execution ease and 
impact of a misuse case are reduced by the countermeasure; 
 cost-effective: cost is 2 and both execution ease and impact of a misuse case 
are reduced by the countermeasure; 
 expensive: cost is 2 or above and either only execution ease of a misuse case 
is reduced by the countermeasure or only impact of a misuse case is reduced 
by the countermeasure; 
 expensive effectiveness: cost is 3 and both execution ease and impact of a 
misuse case are reduced by the countermeasure. 
   To choose the optimal set of countermeasures, we did not use a formula which 
optimizes the systems added value automatically, but rather decided for a 
countermeasure selection strategy together with the stakeholders. In this case, the 
strategy is on countermeasure effectiveness and cost. Accordingly we suggested the 
stakeholder to implementing all ―low hanging fruit‖ countermeasures. Furthermore, 
since defining the categories also influences the strategy, we asked for stakeholders’ 
approval after defining them. This way of choosing the countermeasures to be 
implemented is a heuristical one which allows making decisions transparently and 
based on objective criteria, but still is simple and easy to execute. 
5 Analysis and discussion 
RiskREP is designed to elicit security requirements following a systematic process, 
and considering several perspectives of security: the business perspective, user 
perspective and technical perspective, and both permissible use and misuse. For 
prioritizing countermeasures, RiskREP considers misuse cases´ impacts and incident 
likelihoods, countermeasures´ monetary costs and effectiveness against the risk, and 
combined effects of countermeasures. We have applied RiskREP to an action case in 
order to verify whether RiskREP supports security requirements elicitation and 
prioritization in a way that one can control whether the result is complete or 
lightweight.  
Our action case study showed that RiskREP can be used and leads to a list of 
misuse case partially ordered by risk, and motivated in terms of system architecture as 
well as business goals. It also leads to a prioritized list of countermeasures agreed on 
by stakeholders. It took us about four hours to apply RiskREP to one quality goal. 
This is comparable to the time currently spent on security RE. So, we conclude that 
RiskREP can be used within the available budget for security RE.  
But is it better than the method currently in use? Did it lead to a better 
understanding of security risk and/or to a better set of countermeasures, in terms of 
estimated cost and estimated effectiveness? Before we applied RiskREP, the 
university was using a collection of requirements grouped according to each attribute 
of the system. These requirements were elicited from different stakeholders, and 
eleven high-level requirements were about security. They were of different 
granularity levels, and it was neither possible to compare their risk level, nor to 
validate their completeness. By contrast, RiskREP systematically analyzes the risks 
both from user perspective and technical perspective under consideration of all use 
cases and data flows. We argue that this an improvement w.r.t. the previous way of 
working. While RiskREP potentially could elicit all countermeasures completely, at 
each step it is possible to focus on the most relevant aspects, e.g. most important 
quality goals, most important misuse case etc. and to document this decision. So, 
RiskREP supports also a light-weight analysis that is focused on the most important 
elements.  
Comparing RiskREP to other security RE methods we note that we do not use our 
ordered scales of misuse cases (based on ease of execution and impact on assets), cost 
and effectiveness in inadmissible ways, such as by multiplying impact and ease of 
executing an Incident Propagation Path. This makes the results of using our method 
more meaningful than the results of other methods. Assuming that in this particular 
case study, RiskREP could be used and is an improvement, could it be used in other 
cases, too? Would other people be able to use it with the same effectiveness in other 
cases? RiskREP assumes that the information listed in the meta model can be elicited 
and that stakeholders are able to reach agreement about a countermeasure 
prioritization in terms of their cost and effectiveness. However, for it to be used by 
other requirements engineers than us, we need to supply RiskREP with tool support 
and supporting manuals. We are planning to develop this in the near future. 
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